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RECENT CASES
Picketing Enjoined-Scope of Free Speech Doctrine-No Labor
Dispute Found. The International Association of Machinists filed a petition
with the National Labor Relations Board for certification as exclusive bargaining agency for all employees of a small manufacturing plant. Respondent
unions, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, also sought to represent the employees. They were informed by the Labor Board that the rules
precluded their intervening in absence of a showing of at least one member
employed in the plant; that a petition had been filed by the Machinists; and
that a cross-check of the plant would be made. When the cross-check was
later made, twenty-nine of the thirty-two plant employees designated the
Machinists as their exclusive bargaining agency and the Machinists Union
was certified as such. Meanwhile, the plant owner had refused to bargain with
respondent unions, whereupon they picketed his plant. Appellant then obtained a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction which were
dissolved by the lower court after a trial on the merits. On appeal, held.
Reversed, the majority finding being that there was only a jurisdictional dispute and no labor dispute. The dissent differed on the facts and said there was
an employer-labor dispute because the employer had injected himself into the
controversy Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 127 Wash. Dec. 183,
177 P.(2d) 873 (1947)
Where rival unions seek designation as bargaining agent, certification by
the Labor Board terminates the labor dispute and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and similar state statutes are not applicable. Bloedel Donovan Lbr Mills v.
International Woodworkers of America, 4 Wn.(2d) 62, 102 P.(2d) 270
(1940), Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y 188,
42 N.E.(2d) 480 (1942), Markham & Callow v. International Woodworkers, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P.(2d) 727 (1943). Contra: Yoerg Brewing Co. v.
Brennan, 59 F Supp. 625 (D C. Minn. 1945), American Chain & Cable Co.
Inc. v Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, 68 F Supp. 54 (D. C. N. J. 1946).
See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, c. 120, Pub. Law 101, H. R.
3020, sec. 8(b) (4)C for a codification of the above rule (Taft-Hartley Labor
Bill). Picketing is an exercise of free speech and as such is entitled to constitutional protection. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), American
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U S. 321 (1941) Its exercise has been
limited to the "area of economic conflict" in Carpenter'sand Joiners Union of
America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U S. 722 (1942), but in Bakery Drivers Local
v. Wohl, 315 U S. 769 (1942), the Court held that one need not be involved
in a "labor dispute" as defined by state law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter by peaceful
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picketing. In O'Neil v. Building Service Etc. Union, 9 Wn.(2d) 507, 115
P.(2d) 662, 137 A. L. R. 1102 (1941), the Washington court held that under
the free speech doctrine a union could peacefully picket the business of a
person who had no employees, for the purpose of coercing that lone person,
against his will, to join the picketing union. This court later held that the
doctrine of free speech, as announced by the Supreme Court in the Swing
case, supra, protected picketing even though there was no employer-employee
relationship. S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Union, 11 Wn.(2d) 262,
118 P.(2d) 962 (1941).
In the principal case, the court was more specific in its definition of free
speech by interpreting the United States Supreme Court decisions as laying
down the following rule:
"Peaceful picketing is an exercise of the right of free speech. Organized
labor has the right to commumcate its views either by word of mouth or by
use of placards. This is nothing more nor less than a method of persuasion.
But when the picketing ceases to be used for the purpose of persuasion-just
the minute it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion-it loses the protection of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, and a person or persons
injured by its acts may apply to a court of equity for relief."
This definition clearly recognizes that there are limitations on the doctrine
of "free speech." This is implicit in the leading case of Thornhill v. Alabama,
supra. It raises the question whether or not a different attitude on the part of
the court is indicated than that announced in the O'Neil and S & W Fine
Foods cases, supra. Does the case indicate a return to the tort approach of
granting or denying injunctions by balancing the interests involved? The
advantages of this approach are fully set out in Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, (1942) 56 HARv. L. REv.180.
It may be that under the persuasion-coercion test the court will make closer
evaluations of the facts and in situations such as that presented in Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council, 11 Wn.(2d) 503, 119 P.(2d)
643 (1941) find no ground for denial of the injunction.
J.P S.
Deeds-Construction and Operation-Dedication. X acquired title
to certain land under a warranty deed, the deed providing: "The grantors
herein also warrant and convey to the grantee herein and to the general public
for road purposes, a strip of land 30' wide along the south side of N32 of
N12
" In 1926 X conveyed the 40 acres east of this strip to P without
any specific mention of the strip, and in 1944 X executed to P quitclaim deeds
of a1 interest in the strip in controversy P has used the strip as a means
of ingress and egress to his acreage since acquiring title, but the roadway has
never been formally accepted by any public authority nor have any public
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funds been expended thereon. In recent years D, who owns the tracts of land
abutting the strip on the north and south sides, the full length thereof, has
obstructed the lane. P brought suit to have the obstructions permanently
removed and to quiet title to the strip. The trial court held that P had only
an easement of passageway over the strip and refused to order the gates
removed. P appealed. Held. Reversed. The conveyance to X passed the fee
estate in the land to X subject to an easement in favor of all persons having
occasion to use the strip for road purposes, and consequently P, as the present
owner of the 30' strip dedicated to public use, acquired a right to have the
road kept free of obstructions. Loose v. Locke, 25 Wn.(2d) 599, 171 P.(2d)
849 (1946)
This case seems to have presented for the first time the question whether
it is possible in one deed to pass a fee to a strip of land and at the same time
make a common law dedication of that strip. In construing a deed, the intent
should be gathered from a consideration of all the language used after giving
some meamng to every provision if reasonably possible. Town of Gold Bar
v. Gold Bar Lumber Co., 109 Wash. 391, 186 Pac. 896 (1920), 4 Tiffany,
Real Property (3rd ed. 1939), § 981. In the principal case, the owner by the
terms of the deed "conveyed" the strip to the grantee and to the general
public. Although the general public is incapable of being a grantee of an
estate in land (Patton on Titles (1938) 647, §§ 183, 184), a grant to the
general public may operate as a common law dedication of the property to
public use. Corming v. Aldo, 185 Wash. 570, 55 P.(2d) 1093 (1936) Such
a dedication does not affect the ownership of the land but merely gives to the
public the right of user therein, 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed. 1939)
§ 1112, for it is well recognized that a dedication of land does not require
a particular grantee. Meeker v. Puyallup, 5 Wash. 759, 32 Pac. 727 (1893).
To constitute a valid common law dedication two elements are necessary
There must be (1) a clear showing of an intention to dedicate the land to
public use, Provident Trust Co. v. Spokane, 63 Wash. 92, 114 Pac. 1030
(1911), and (2) an acceptance by the public, the mere public user being
sufficient to justify a finding that there was an acceptance. Okanogan County
v. Cheetham, 37 Wash. 682, 80 Pac. 262 (1905), Seattle v. Hinckley, 67
Wash. 273, 121 Pac. 444 (1912). Both elements appear in the principal case
for the intention to dedicate to public use is expressed in the terms of the
deed, and the court from the circumstances of the case found sufficient public
user to constitute acceptance.
By construing the deed as passing a fee to the grantee with an easement over
to the general public, the court has thus made it possible to convey a fee
estate and in the same deed to make a common law dedication of the strip to
the general public for road purposes. The court by so interpreting the
conveyance has given effect, so far as is possible, to every word in the instrument.
J.W S.
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Tax Liens-Priority-Not Applicable Against Property of a Third
Person. Where an.employer has become delinquent in making his unemployment compensation contributions, the State Unemployment Compensation
Act, REr. REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9998-231, authorizes a lien, prior to all
other liens except taxes, against not only the interest of the employer, but also
the interests of all others in the plant, works, equipment, or buildings improved, operated, or constructed by such employer. In conformance with the
statute, the state attached respondent's personal property, which respondent
had leased to the delinquent taxpayer. The trial court found the lien invalid.
On appeal, held. The statute so far as it purports to create a lien prior to all
others against the interests of others than the delinquent taxpayer in the plant,
works, equipment, or buildings is void as a contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution and Article I, § 3 of the state constitution. The court was careful to limit the holding of unconstitutionality of the
condemned portion of the statute to situations where a title interest of a third
party is involved, thus preserving the priority of the state's lien over that of a
mortgagee or other lien claimant. State v. Lawton, 25 Wn.(2d) 750, 172
P.(2d) 465 (1946).
Taxes generally are given priority over other incumbrances, even, though
such others be prior in time, if the statute so authorizes. 4 Cooley, Taxation
(4th Ed., 1924) 2467 Washington recognizes this rule. City of Walla Walla
v. State of Washington, 197 Wash. 357, 85 P.(2d) 676 (1938), Minshull v.
Douglas County, 133 Wash. 650, 234 Pac. 661 (1925), Carstens & Earles,

Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 88, 146 Pac.-381 (1915), Hanson v. Carr,
66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911). The'rule has been applied in Washington
with respect to contributions due under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
REr. REv. STAT. § 7682. Roebling & Sons Co. v. Frederickson Logging &
Timber Co., 153 Wash. 580, 280 Pac. 93 (1929), C. S. Barlow & Sons v.
H. & B. Lumber Co., 153 Wash. 565, 280 Pac. 88 (1929)

The Lawton decision holds squarely that property of a third person in which
the interest of the taxpayer is merely possessory is not subject to a lien for
taxes due from such taxpayer. The court decided a similar problem under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, in Finos v. Netherlands American
MortgageBank, 147 Wash. 86, 265 Pac. 167 (1928). In that case the bank had

sold the premises under a forfeitable executory sales contract to one Cashman,
who had in turn leased to the taxpayer. In an action to establish a lien for
industrial insurance premiums owed by the lessee, the state attempted to
subject the premises to its lien .on the ground that the lien attached to "real
estate

operated

by any employer" under Wash. Laws, 1923, c. 136,

§ 3. The court held the lien could not attach to the fee interest of the bank.
In the instant case the court relied heavily on the Finos holding. However,
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the Finos case, while it employed language applicable in the present situation,
involved assertion of a lien against a vendor's interest which arose prior to
the operation of the statute. In order to find a valid lien, the court would have
been forced to give the statute a retroactive effect. This is not true of the
Lawton case. Here the lien purports to attach for taxes becorming due, and to
affect a lease made after the statute came into operation. In its decision
the court conceded that language contrary to and broader than the Finos case
and the present decision appeared in the Barlow and Roebling cases, supra,
but correctly pointed out that such langauge was mere dicta in those cases.
Thus the Lawton case is the first in this jurisdiction to pass on the precise
question involved.
In other situations the Washington court has been less willing to protect
legal title from claims created by one in possession of the property The court
has recognized the general rule that a lien for improvements to a chattel will
be valid against the owner. Crosser v. Cudihee, 85 Wash. 237, 147 Pac. 1146
(1915). The state's lien takes priority over those liens. Tripp v. Niagara
Logging Co., 178 Wash. 551, 35 P.(2d) 95 (1934). But under the holding of
the Lawton case such priority extends only to cases where the party whose
delinquency gives rise to the lien holds legal title to the property levied upon,
or where the holder of the legal title authorizes or accepts benefits from the
operation giving rise to the state's claim.
R. G. S.
Trade Umons-Proceedings by Labor Umon to Expel MembersValidity-Resort to Courts. Ps were members of D union. D union
expelled Ps on the ground they solicited fellow members to join a competing
union. D union had a closed shop agreement with the shipyard where Ps
were employed and upon notification that expulsion proceedings had been
instituted, Ps were discharged. They thereupon brought action against D
union to secure reinstatement and damages for loss of earnings resulting from
their discharge from the date thereof until date of trial. The trial court
awarded Ps damages, but only from date of discharge by the shipyard until
date of expulsion by the union, on the ground that Ps had not exhausted their
remedies within the union. Ps appealed. Held. (1) D union failed to follow
its prescribed procedure in expelling Ps, and (2) the ground for expulsion was
one not authorized by the constitution and by-laws of D union; therefore,
the expulsion was a nullity, and Ps were not required to appeal within D
union but could resort immediately to the courts for relief. The dissent is
based upon the premise that the expulsion was valid, and therefore Ps must
exhaust their remedies within D union before resorting to the courts. Leo v.
Local Union No. 612, 126 Wash. Dec. 466, 174 P.(2d) 523 (1946).
The general rule in respect to judicial interference with expulsion from
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voluntary associations, that courts will not interfere with decisions of the
association unless (1) the action is contrary to its rules, (2) the rules -themselves are contrary to natural justice, or (3) the member is expelled in bad
faith, was announced in the leading and colorful English case, Dawkins ,v.
Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615. To the same effect: Kelly v. Grand Circle Women
of Woodcraft, 40 Wash. 691, 82 Pac. 1007 (1905). The Washington court
has-stated that it will not interfere unless pecuniary and'property rights are
involved. Peoples Savings Bank v. FirstNational Bank, 102 Wash. 436, 440,
173 Pac. 52, 54 (1918), Stivers v. Blethen, 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923)
Equity courts will sometimes go to great lengths to find a property right to
protect, and often the right is more of a personal than a property nature.
Walsh, Equity (1930) 275. As a general rule, the courts will not interfere in
the controversy where the member has not fully exhausted the relief' available
to him within the organization. Herman v. Plummer, 20 Wash. 363, 55 Pac.
315 (1898), Constantino v. Moreschi, 9 Wn.(2d) 638, 115 P.(2d) 955
(1941). However, this prerequisite is not required (1) when the procedure
within the organization is expensive, (2) subject to great delay, or (3) when
it appears that it would be futile and vain. Dubcich v. Grand Lodge A. 0
U W., 33 Wash. 651, 74 Pac. 832 (1903), Local Lodge No. 104 v. International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930),
Furniture Workers Union v. United Brotherhood of Carpentersand Joiners,
6 Wn.(2d) 654, 108 P.(2d) 651 (1940). Washington has consistently required that regardless of the rules of the organization, the expelled member be
accorded the basic due process of notice and a fair hearing. State ex rel.
Cicorta v. Corgiat, 50 Wash. 95, 96 Pac. 689 (1908), State ex rel. Rowland
v. Seattle BaseballAssociation, 61 Wash. 79, 111 Pac. 1055, 31 L. R.A. (N.s.)
512 (1910), Furniture Workers Union v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners, supra. In this jurisdiction a sizable body of authority now
supports the majority rule that the member need not first exhaust his remedies within the organization but can apply directly to the courts for relief
where the expulsion proceeding can be considered void and without jurisdiction. Relief may be had both by way of injunction resulting in reinstatement,
and damages for pecumary loss which can be directly attributed to the
expulsion. Ray v.Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44
P.(2d) 787 (1935), Cox v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 190 Wash.
51i, 69 P.(2d) 148 (1937), and the instant case.
These holdings indicate that our court will go far to protect the property
and pecuniary rights of those expelled from voluntary associations.
H. P
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Witnesses-Husband and Wife--Waiver of Privilege. Ds, husband
and wife, were charged jointly with first degree murder. At the trial the
most damaging evidence against them consisted of admissions allegedly
made by Ds while in custody, some in and some out of the other's presence,
testified to by a police officer, but denied by Ds. Ds' counsel objected to
their admission as an indirect violation of RPm. Rzv. STAT. § 1214, providing that one spouse shall not be examined for or against the other spouse
without the latter's consent. The court thereupon instructed the witness to
confine his testimony to statements made by each D involving only himself
or herself. On appeal from judgment of conviction the supreme court held.
(1) The statute could have been violated by the testimony of a witness
to an out-of-court statement by one spouse implicating the other; but m
making the admissions voluntarily and with the other's implied consent, D$
waived their statutory right to object to testimony concerning such admissions
at the trial, (2) The witness did not violate the court's instructions. State v.
Clark, 126 Wash. Dec. 128, 183 P.(2d) 179 (1946)
If it were true, as the court stated, that the witness succeeded m confining
Ins testimony to admissions made by each D implicating only the maker of
the admission, there seems little room for the operation of Rxm. REv. STAT.
§ 1214, to give meaning to the court's discussion of the marital privilege,
it must be assumed that some of the admssions may have constituted testimony against the other spouse. The privilege granted by the statute arose at
common law and has been retained in some form by all but a few states.
8 WlGmoxR, EVmENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2228. Although the statute m terms
speaks only of the testimony of one spouse for or against the other, there
is some authority for holding that it can be violated by the testimony of a
third person as to a statement by a spouse when the spouse would be incompetent to make that statement in court. Jones v. Jones, 96 Wash. 172,
164 Pac. 757 (1917), Bowen v. State, 36 Ga. App. 666, 137 S. E. 793 (1927)
In Washington, the privilege may be expressly or impliedly waived, but only
by the spouse in whose favor the privilege is granted. State v. Frye, 45 Wash.
645, 89 Pac. 170 (1907), Williamson v. Williamson, 183 Wash. 71, 48 P.(2d)
588 (1935). The reported case holds the privilege is waived when the testifying spouse makes a voluntary, out-of-court admission implicating the D
spouse with the latter's implied consent. In State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144,
81 Pac. 561 (1905), the court, citing no authority, held that testimony as
to the voluntary confessions of the wife of the D were admissible since such
confessions are not protected by the husband-wife privilege. Although the
Mann case seems squarely applicable and has never been overruled, no
reference to it was made in the reported decision. It has been held in other
jurisdictions that testimony as to what the spouse witness said at a previous
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hearing without objection was admissible, as the privilege had been waived.
State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 Pac. 489 (1911), McCoy v. State, 221
Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930). In those cases, however, the waiver was intrajudicial and thus these cases are clearly distinguishable.
The holding that the privilege may be waived by the party's extra-judicial
conduct seems questionable. But see Rule 231 of the MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE proposed by the American Law Institute, where it is provided
that a privilege may be waived by contract not to claim it or by voluntary
disclosure.
H. P
Torts-Invasion of Right of Privacy6-Publicity Afforded Private
Debts. D, assignee of an unpaid bill owed by P, telephoned P's employer,
told him of the debt which P refused to pay, and said he would garnish P's
wages if P did not pay Answering in detail P's claim to an invasion of her
right to privacy, the Supreme Court affirmed an order sustaining a demurrer
to P's complaint, and held. Because the conduct. alleged does not constitute
a violation of a right of privacy, it is not necessary to determine whether such
a right exists in Washington. Lewis v. Physiciansand DentistsCredit Bureau,
127 Wash. Dec. 252, 177 P.(2d) 896 (1947).
The right of privacy was formulated in 1890. Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HA~y. L. Rv. 193, and has been accepted since
then as a remediable injury by the majority of courts willing to decide the
question. The protection is given against an outrage of one's feelings and the
subjective injury of mental anguish resulting therefrom, and in this respect
is distinguished from defamation. The "right" was designed as a bulwark
against obliteration of the personality by the "invasions" of modern society.
Once accepted, the "right" has proved readily expandable to fit new "invasions." The right is limited in its scope by the necessities of the social
obligation. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.(2d) 806 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
Batletta v. McFeeley, 113 N. J. Eq. 28, 166 Atl. 144 (1933). The typical
cases are the unauthorized display or publication of one's portrait, Pavesch
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101
(1905), contra: Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64
N. E.442 (1902), which led to enactment of a statute protecting the "nght";
oppressive publicity in the collection of debts, Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky
765, 299 S.W 967, 55 A. L. R. 964 (1927), public use of one's name, Hinsk
v. Meter & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.(2d) 438, 138 A. L. R. 1 (1941),
eavesdropping, McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92,
2 S.E.(2d) 810 (1939); and wiretapping, Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky 225,
37 S.W.(2d) 46 (1931). Oregon recently gave broad recognition to the legal
right to privacy by granting relief for mental.suffering which resulted from
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the unauthorized signing of P's name to a telegram urging the governor to
veto a bill. Hinsh v. Meter & Frank Co., supra. RESTATEMNT, TORTS
(1939) § 867, declares: "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the lublic is liable to the other."
The Washington court has never directly passed upon the question, but on
at least one occasion it intimated that it might sanction a remedy for an
invasion of the right to privacy In Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691,
117 Pac. 594, 35 L. R. A. (N.s.) 595 (1911), while refusing recovery to one
whose picture was published in a family group in connection with her father's
arrest, the court stated that the facts did not fall within rules theretofore
recognized and protected by other courts as an invasion of the right to privacy.
However, in Hodgeman v. Olson, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915), the
court said that the right to privacy, if it'has any existence in this state, was
forfeited, insofar as distribution of photographs was concerned, by virtue of
plaintiff's felony conviction. The Lewis case offers perhaps the weakest contention so far presented and hardly merits the extended treatment given P's
complaint; but it reveals that the court chooses to remain noncommittal as to
the existence of legal remedy for an invasion of one's privacy until a strong
case is presented for its consideration.
See, generally- Nizer, The Right of Privacy (1941) 39 MicH. L. REv. 526;
Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. REv. 353, 600; Green,
The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 237, Annotation, 138 A. L. R.
22; Hinisk v. Meier & Frank Co., supra.
C.J..
Process--Substituted Service--Usual Place of Abode. Mandamus
proceeding to compel J. L. Crockett, as judge of the Third Judicial Court,
to take jurisdiction in a case entitled Booth v. Fairbanks. In that case
summons was served on the eighteen-year-old D by leaving a copy thereof
at the home of his parents eight days after D had departed for duty in the
Navy Prior to this time D had always lived with his parents, and at the
time of service of summons D was communicating regularly with his parents
and had actual knowledge of the summons. Most of D's personal belongings
remained at his parents' home. The trial court granted a motion to quash
the service because not made at "usual place of abode." Held. Alternate
writ of mandamus recalled and action dismissed. The motion made n the
original action to quash the service was correctly granted. Service was not
made at D's "usual place of abode" within the meaning of UTAH CODE (1943),
§ 104-5-11(8) In the statutory view one's "usual place of abode" has a
meaning more restricted than either domicile or residence, and refers to the
place where one is actually living at the time when service was made. Booth
v. Crockett,.... Utah ...., 173 P.(2d) 647 (1946).
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This holding represents narrow construction of the statute, which is in
line with the minority and Utah rule, Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108
Pac. 931 (1910), Kurilla v. Rotk, 132 N. J. L. 213, 38 A.(2d) 862 (1944),
see also 127 A. L. R. 1267 (1940). Despite the early statement that "usual
place of abode" means the defendant's "then present residence", Earle v.
McVesgh, 91 U. S. 503 (1876) (which was cited in Booth v. Crockett, supra)
the majority and present federal rule seems more liberal. "The holding that
the 'usual place of abode' is the place where the defendant is living at the
time of service is contrary to the weight of authority, which holds that where
temporary residence is established away from the normal or usual residence
the 'place of abode' is the usual residence, regardless of the fact that defendant
may be occupying the temporary residence at the time of service." McFadden
v. Shore, 60 F Supp. 8 (D. C. Penn., 1945) (Service on D's parents at their
home after his induction into military service, upheld), accord, Revinsks v.
Rowe, 131 F.(2d) 687 (1942) (service at home of D's mother upheld,
where he had been absent for twenty years, except for occasional visits,
but had not established another domicile), see also Sktdmore v. Green,
33 F Supp. 529 (1940). The interpretation given by the federal courts
seems suited to the reason and purpose of substituted service statutes. As
set out in RzSTATMENT, CONFLICT or LAws (1934) § 79, "A state can
exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual domiciled within
the state, although he is not present within the state." Consistent with due
process, jurisdiction may be had over the person of the D if the service is
reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the action and an opportunity
to be heard, and a judgment based upon such service is entitled to full faith
and credit. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, (1940). Although the D in the
instant case had actual knowledge of the summons, such knowledge is not

essential to validity of the judgment. RESTATEMUNT, CONFLICT Or LAWS
§ 75, Larson v. Zabrosks, 21 Wn.(2d) 572, 152 P.(2d) 154 (1944).
The Washington statute, R1m. REv. STAT., § 226(12), which uses the
language "house of his usual abode" has, except for one case, consistently
been given liberal construction. Northwestern & P Hypotheek Bank v.
Ridpath, 29 Wash. 687, 70 Pac. 139 (1902) (service on D's wife at place
where she and children reside upheld, although D was en route to South
America), accord. Crowder v. Morphy, 61 Wash. 626, 112 Pac. 742 (1911),
Shorrock v. Shorrock, 185 Wash. 623, 56 P.(2d) 674 (1936), cf. Wilbert v.
Day, 83 Wash. 390, 145 Pac. 446 (1915). Contra: Dolan v. Baldrsdge, 165
Wash. 69, 4 P.(2d) 871 (1931), ("usual place of abode" held to mean the
place where D is actually living at the time of service; but the case makes
no reference to previous cases on the point, has not been cited in the later
L. G.
cases, and so cannot be regarded as definitive).

